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Abstract
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness
to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-
person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution
a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and
the co-players’ income with weight factors 1 − Q and Q. These models are studied within a wide range of payoff parameters using
Monte Carlo simulations for noisy strategy updates and by spatial stability analysis in the low noise limit. For fraternal players
(Q = 1/2) the system evolves into ordered arrangements of strategies in the low noise limit in a way providing optimum payoff for
the whole society. Dominance of defectors, representing the ”tragedy of the commons”, is found within the regions of prisoner’s
dilemma and stag hunt game for selfish players (Q = 0). Due to the symmetry in the effective utility function the system exhibits
similar behavior even for Q = 1 that can be interpreted as the ”lovers’ dilemma”.
Keywords: evolutionary games, social dilemmas, selfishness, fraternity
1. Introduction
The evolutionary game theory has been evolving and ex-
panding progressively in the last years due to the emergent
experimental facts and the deeper understanding of models
developed [for a survey see the books by Nowak (2006),
Sigmund (2010), and reviews by Szabo´ and Fa´th (2007) and
by Perc and Szolnoki (2010)]. In the last decades huge ef-
forts are focused on the emergence of cooperative behav-
ior because of its importance in many human and biolog-
ical systems (Camerer, 2003; Gintis, 2010). In the first
multi-agent evolutionary systems the repeated interaction is
described by the payoff matrix of traditional game theory
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and the evolution is
governed by a dynamical rule resembling the Darwinian se-
lection (Maynard Smith, 1982). The systematic investigations
have explored the relevance of the games itself (as interactions
including the set of strategies), the connectivity structure, and
also the dynamical rule. Recently, the co-evolutionary games
have extended the original frontiers of evolutionary games by
introducing additional (personal) features and complex dynam-
ical rules allowing the simultaneous time-dependence in each
ingredient of the mathematical model. The possible personal
character of players can be enhanced further in a way to postu-
late players who consider not just their own payoffs but also the
neighbors’ income.
To elaborate this possibility we will study the social dilem-
mas with players located on a square lattice and collect income
from 2 × 2 games played with all their nearest neighbors. Now,
it is assumed that the myopic players wish to maximize their
own utility function when they adopt another possible strategy.
Throughout this utility function the players combine the self-
interest with the other-regarding preference in a tunable way.
Besides it, the applied strategy adoption rule involves some
noise (characterizing fluctuations in payoffs, mistakes and/or
personal freedom in the decision) that helps the system evolve
towards the final stationary state via a spatial ordering process.
The present work was motivated by our previous study con-
sidering the consequence of pairwise collective strategy up-
dates in a similar model (Szabo´ et al., 2010). It turned out that
the frequency of cooperators is increased significantly in the
case of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) when two randomly chosen
players favors a new strategy pair if it increases the sum of
their individual payoff. The latter strategy update can be inter-
preted as a spatial extension of cooperative games where play-
ers can form coalitions to enhance the group income. Some
aspects of the other-regarding preference is modelled very re-
cently by Wang et al. (2011) who studied a spatial evolutionary
PD game with synchronized stochastic imitation. On the other
hand, the experimental investigations of the human and animal
behavior (Flood, 1958; Milinski et al., 1997; Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) have also indicated the pres-
ence of different types of mutual helps (Mitteldorf and Wilson,
2000), like charity (Li et al., 2010), inequality aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, 2006;
Scheuring, 2010b,a; Xianyu, 2010), and juvenile-adult interac-
tions (Lion, 2009).
The above-mentioned relevant improvement in the level of
cooperation has inspired us to quantify the effect of the group
size and the number of players choosing new strategies si-
multaneously. From a series of numerical investigations we
could draw a general picture that can be well exemplified with
the present simpler model. More precisely, the most relevant
improvement is achieved for those cases where each myopic
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player has taken into consideration all of her neighbor’s payoff
together with her own payoff with equal weight when selecting
a new strategy. Now we will study a more general model where
the utility function of each player is combined from her own
payoff and her co-players’ payoff with weight factors (1 − Q)
and Q. In this notation Q = 0 represents a selfish myopic player
who wish to maximize her own personal income irrespective of
others. The fraternal players with Q = 1/2 favor to optimize
the income (redistributed and) shared equally between each pair
when choosing another strategy. The present model allows us
to investigate the effect of other-regarding preference in spatial
models for different levels of altruism (Q). For the most altru-
istic case (Q = 1) the players wish to maximize the co-players’
income and the system behavior also exhibits a state resem-
bling the ”tragedy of the commons” that can be interpreted as
the ”lovers’ dilemma”.
It is emphasized that the resultant formalism (payoff ma-
trix) of the other-regarding preference was already investi-
gated by Taylor and Nowak (2007) as a model to capture
the kin- and group-selection mechanisms (Taylor and Nowak,
2006; Wild and Traulsen, 2007). The origin of the basic idea
goes back to the work of Maynard Smith (1982) and Grafen
(1979) who studied animal behaviors between relatives. The
present work can be considered as a continuation of the men-
tioned investigations. Now our attention will be focused on
the consequences of structured population for a myopic strat-
egy update.
Using the terminology of social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980;
Santos et al., 2006; Roca et al., 2009) the above mentioned
model with a stochastic myopic strategy update is defined and
contrasted with other versions in the following section. The re-
sults of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are summarized in Sec-
tion 3 for a finite noise level. Section 4 is addressed to the spa-
tial stability analysis in the zero noise limit and the main results
are discussed in the final section.
2. Model
2.1. Brief overview
The possible solutions of the two-person, two-strategy evo-
lutionary games depend on the details including the spatial
structure, the range of interactions, the payoffs, the dynamical
rule(s), the payoffs, and the measure of noise (Szabo´ and Fa´th,
2007; Roca et al., 2009; Chen and Wang, 2009; Perc, 2009;
Liu et al., 2010; Dai et al., 2010; Rong et al., 2010). Before
specifying the presently studied model accurately we briefly
survey the main features of these solutions.
We consider a simple model with players located on the sites
x of a square lattice (consisting of L × L sites with periodic
boundary conditions). Each player can follow one of the two
strategies called unconditional cooperation (sx = C) or uncon-
ditional defection (sx = D) within the context of social dilem-
mas. If these strategies are denoted by two-dimensional unit
vectors, as
sx = C =
( 1
0
)
and sx = D =
( 0
1
)
, (1)
then the payoff of player x against her neighbor at site x+ δ can
be expressed by the following matrix product:
Px = s+x A · sx+δ, (2)
where s+x denotes the transpose of the state vector sx. The payoff
matrix is given as
A =
( 1 S
T 0
)
, (3)
where the reward of mutual cooperation is chosen to be unity
(R = 1) and the mutual defection yields zero income (P = 0)
for both players without any loss of generality. The coopera-
tor receives S (sucker’s payoff) against a defector who gets T ,
the temptation to choose defection. This terminology was origi-
nally introduced for the description of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
(where T > R > P > S ) and later extended for weaker social
dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Santos et al., 2006), too.
For this notation the S − T payoff plane can be divided into
four segments (see Figs. 1) where the possible Nash equilib-
ria are denoted by pairs of open, closed, or half-filled circles
referring to pure cooperation, pure defection, and mixed strate-
gies, respectively. For example, within the range of Harmony
(H) game the Nash equilibrium (from which no player has in-
centives to deviate unilaterally) is the (Pareto optimal) mutual
cooperation. On the contrary, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
the only Nash equilibrium is the mutual defection yielding the
second worst payoff. Figure 1a illustrates that both the D − D
and C − C strategy pairs are Nash equilibria within the region
of Stag Hunt (SH) game where S < 0 and T < 1. For the
Hawk-Dove (HD) game besides the D − C and C − D strategy
pairs there is an additional (so-called mixed) Nash equilibrium
where the players can choose either cooperation or defection
with a probability dependent on the payoff parameters.
Many relevant features of these types of evolutionary games
have already been clarified. For example, if the frequency of
cooperators and defectors are controlled by a replicator dynam-
ics (favoring the strategy of higher payoff) within a well-mixed
population then the system evolves towards a final stationary
state related to the possible Nash equilibria as illustrated in
Fig. 1b (Nowak, 2006). Namely, cooperators (defectors) die
out within the region of PD (H game) while they can coexist for
the case of HD game. The radial segmentation of the region of
SH game in Fig. 1b indicates that here the system develops into
one of the homogeneous phase and the final result depends on
the composition of the initial state.
The spatial arrangement of players (with a short range inter-
action), however, affects significantly the evolutionary process
depending on the payoffs. For the present lattice system one
can evaluate the total sum of individual payoffs for the ordered
arrangement of C and D strategies. Figure 1c shows that the
maximum total payoff is achieved for homogeneous coopera-
tion (sx = C,∀x) if T + S < 2. In the opposite case (T + S > 2)
the total (or average) payoff is maximized if the cooperators and
defectors are arranged in a chessboard-like manner as indicated
by the pattern (Szabo´ et al., 2010).
The comparison of the Figs. 1a and 1c illustrates the relevant
differences between the suggestions of traditional game theory
2
ST
1
0
-1
0 1 2
HDH
PDSH
a S
T
1
0
-1
0 1 2
HDH
PDSH
b
T+S=2
S
T
1
0
-1
0 1 2
HDH
PD
SH
c S
T
1
0
-1
0 1 2
HDH
PDSH
d
Figure 1: (Color online) Overview of possible solutions on T − S plane for dif-
ferent conditions. (a) Nash equilibria for two-person one-shot games. (b) Stable
strategy pairs for replicator dynamics in well-mixed population. (c) Optimal
strategy choice on the square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and (d)
the results of myopic strategy update in the zero noise limit for the same con-
nectivity structure. The chessboard like patterns refer to similar arrangement
of cooperators and defectors on the square lattice for nearest-neighbor interac-
tions. The regions of Harmony (H), Hawk-Dove (HD), Stag Hunt (SH) games,
and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are separated by dashed-dotted lines. The sym-
bols refer to Nash equilibria (a), evolutionarily stable strategies (b), and strategy
pairs on neighboring sites (c and d) where the empty, closed, and half-filled cir-
cles indicate cooperative, defective, and mixed strategies.
when assuming two selfish players and the optimum total pay-
off with respect to the whole society with players located on
the sites of a square lattice. Notice, that the chessboard-like ar-
rangement of cooperators and defectors can provide optimal to-
tal payoffwithin a region involving a suitable part of the PD, the
HD, and the H games. The curiosity of these systems is more
pronounced if we compare it with the consequences of differ-
ent evolutionary rules in the lattice models (Nowak and May,
1992, 1993; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; Roca et al., 2009). Finally,
in Fig. 1d we summarize only the results of a spatial evolution-
ary game (Szabo´ et al., 2010) obtained when the myopic play-
ers can choose another strategy if this change increases their
own payoff assuming quenched neighborhood in the zero noise
limit.
2.2. Model specification
In the present work the latter dynamical rule is extended by
allowing players to consider not only their own but also their
neighbors’ payoffs. The system is started from a random initial
strategy distribution where both C and D strategies are present
with the same frequency. The evolution of the strategy distribu-
tion is controlled by repeating the random sequential strategy
updates in myopic manner. Accordingly, in each elementary
step we choose a player x at random who can modify her strat-
egy from sx to s′x (e.g., D → C or vice versa) with a probability:
W(sx → s′x) =
1
1 + exp[(U(sx) − U(s′x))/K]
, (4)
where K characterizes the average amplitude of noise (that can
appear for fluctuating payoffs) disturbing the players’ rational
decision and the utility function combines the payoffs of the
player x with the payoffs of her co-players within the same
games. Namely,
U(sx) =
∑
δ
[(1 − Q)s+x A · sx+δ + Qs+x+δA · sx] , (5)
where the summation runs over all nearest neighbors pairs. In
this notation Q characterizes the strength of altruism of the
player. For simplicity, we now assume that all players have
have the same Q value, thus the whole population is described
by the same attitude of selfishness. For Q = 0 the players are
selfish and the resultant behavior has already been explored in
a previous work (Szabo´ et al., 2010). If Q = 1/2 then each
player tries to maximize a payoff obtained by sharing equally
the common payoffs between the interacting players. In the ex-
treme case (Q = 1) players focus exclusively on maximizing
the other’s income. To give real-life example, the latter behav-
ior mimics the attitude of lovers or the behavior of relatives in
biological systems as discussed by (Taylor and Nowak, 2007,
2006).
Notice that the present model can be mapped into a spatial
evolutionary game with selfish (Q = 0) players for myopic
strategy update if we introduce an effective payoff matrix,
Ae f f =
( 1 (1 − Q)S + QT
(1 − Q)T + QS 0
)
. (6)
The effective payoff matrix becomes symmetric for Q = 1/2
and the corresponding model is equivalent to a kinetic Ising
model where the evolution of spin configuration is controlled
by the Glauber dynamics in the presence of a unit external mag-
netic field (Glauber, 1963). In the latter case the system evolves
towards a stationary state where the probability of a configura-
tion can be described by the Boltzmann statistics and the laws
of thermodynamics are valid (Stanley, 1971; Blume, 2003).
Finally we emphasize that the simultaneous exchanges S ↔
T and Q ↔ (1 − Q) leave the system (Ae f f ) unchanged. This
is the reason why the MC analysis can be restricted to the cases
where 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1/2.
3. Monte Carlo results
The MC simulations are performed when varying the pay-
offs S and T at a few representative values of Q for L ≥ 400
and K = 0.25. In most of the cases the system is started from
a random initial state and after a suitable thermalization time
tth the stationary state is characterized by the fraction of co-
operators (ρA and ρB) averaged over a sampling time ts in the
sublattices A and B corresponding to the white and black boxes
on the chessboard. In fact there exist two equivalent sublattice
3
ordered arrangements of cooperators and defectors: (1) ρA → 1
and ρB → 0; (2) ρA → 0 and ρB → 1 if K → 0. During the
transient time both types of ordered arrangements are present in
a poly-domain structure and the typical linear size of domains
growth as l ∝ √t. Such a situation can occur for example within
the region of HD game as demonstrated in Fig. 2. Finally one
Figure 2: The system evolves through such typical patterns into a state con-
quered by only one of the ordered chessboard-like arrangement. This snapshot
shows cooperators (white boxes) and defectors (black boxes) on a 100 × 100
portion of a larger system for T = 1.5, S = 0.5, Q = 0 and K = 0.25 at time
t = 30 MCS (Monte Carlo steps) if the system started from a random initial
state.
of the ordered structure prevails the whole spatial system. Ev-
idently, the requested thermalization time (to achieve the final
mono-domain structure) increases with system size as tth ∝ L2.
It is emphasized that the domain growing process is blocked
for those dynamical rules forbidding the adoption of irra-
tional choices (when U(sx) > U(sx)′). The latter cases yield
frozen poly-domain patterns where ρA = ρB as described by
Sysi-Aho et al. (2005); Wang et al. (2006). The present evo-
lutionary rule allows the irrational choices with a probability
decreasing very fast when K → 0. Consequently, the expected
value of tth is also increased drastically if K → 0 (Bray, 1994).
The resultant technical difficulties can be avoided if the system
is started from a biased initial state where one of the sublattice
is occupied by only cooperators (or defectors) while other sites
are filled randomly with C or D players.
For selfish players (Q = 0) the results of MC simulations
are summarized in Fig. 3 in the low noise limit where the read-
ers can distinguish three types of ordered structure. Namely,
the above mentioned sublattice ordering occurs within the ter-
ritory of HD game. The ”homogeneous” D and C phases
are separated by a first order transition located along the line
S = T −1 when varying the payoff parameters. More precisely,
ρA = ρB → 1 in the limit K → 0 if S > T − 1 and T < 1.
On the contrary, the system evolves into a state called ”tragedy
of the commons” (ρA = ρB → 0 if K → 0) when S < T − 1
and S < 0. In the case of finite noise, the sharp ordered phases
disappear and point defect can emerge resulting in intermedi-
ate values for cooperator frequency. Notice that the transitions
from the homogeneous phases to the symmetry breaking sublat-
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Figure 3: MC results for the frequencies of cooperators in the two sublattices of
the square lattice as a function of T and S for K = 0.25 and Q = 0. Dashed lines
denote distinguishable ρs in the sublattices A and B while the solid lines indicate
ρs when varying T for a fixed S in the absence of this symmetry breaking.
tice ordered structure follow similar scenario. Namely, the sta-
tionary frequency of cooperators evolves toward a state (where
ρA = ρB ≃ 1/2) when approaching the critical point from the
homogeneous regions while |ρA − ρb| vanishing algebraically
from the opposite direction. The width of the transition regime
in both side of the critical point is proportional to K.
The sublattice ordering as a continuous transition belongs to
the Ising universality class (Szabo´ et al., 2010; Stanley, 1971).
This means that the vanishing order parameter (|ρA − ρB|) fol-
lows a power law behavior when approaching the critical point
and simultaneously the correlation length, the relaxation time,
and the magnitude of fluctuations diverge algebraically. The lat-
ter effects imply an increase in the uncertainty of the numerical
data. To avoid this problem we used a significantly larger size
(typically L > 4000) and longer thermalization and sampling
time (tth ≃ ts > 106 MCS) in the close vicinity of the transition
point. Using this method we could reduce the statistical error
comparable to the line thickness.
All the above mentioned three phases and also the main char-
acteristics of the phase transitions are present for Q = 1/3 as
demonstrated in Fig. 4. The most striking difference between
Figs. 3 and 4 is the shift of the phase boundaries. As a con-
sequence for Q = 1/3 the territory of the ”tragedy of the com-
mons” (in the T − S plane) is reduced. Similar behavior was
observed in a model where the evolution is controlled by pair-
wise collective strategy update (Szabo´ et al., 2010).
Fundamentally different behavior is found for the fraternal
players (Q = 1/2) as illustrated in Fig. 5. In this case the results
depend only on T + S and the system does not fall into the state
of the ”tragedy of the commons”. It is emphasized that in the
zero noise limit the system evolves into the state providing the
maximum total payoff (compare Figs. 1c and 5).
The above numerical investigations were repeated for several
noise levels, too. These numerical data have justified that in the
zero noise limit the T − S phase diagrams coincide with those
we derived from stability analysis of the spatial patterns.
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Figure 4: Frequencies of cooperators in the two sublattices A and B as a func-
tion of T and S for K = 0.25 and Q = 1/3.
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Figure 5: MC results for the frequencies of cooperators in the sublattices A and
B as a function of T and S if Q = 1/2 and K = 0.25.
4. Stability analysis
To have a deeper understanding about the ordering process,
we first study the stability of the sublattice ordered arrangement
of strategies against a single strategy flip in the zero noise limit.
The two possibilities are demonstrated in Fig. 6. In the first case
Figure 6: Possible elementary processes destabilizing the chessboard like ar-
rangement of cooperators (white) and defectors (gray).
a defector reverses its strategy if the cooperation yields higher
utility, that is, if
4[(1 − Q)T + QS ] < 4 (7)
or after some algebraic simplification
QS < 1 − (1 − Q)T . (8)
Due to the absence of the second neighbor interactions all the
defectors (within the chessboard like structure) are enforced to
cooperate in the low noise limit if the condition (8) is satisfied.
Consequently, in this case the sublattice ordered arrangement
of cooperation and defection transforms into homogeneous co-
operation.
One can easily check that the appearance of a single defector
in the state of homogeneous cooperation is favored if QS >
1 − (1 − Q)T which is the opposite of the condition (8). The
random sequential repetition of this type of point defect yields
a poly-domain structure resembling to those plotted in Fig. 2.
As mentioned before, this poly-domain structure is not stable
for K > 0 because the fluctuations changes the sizes of ordered
domains and their vanishing is not balanced by the appearance
of new domains. Finally the system evolves into one of the
sublattice ordered structure.
From the above analysis one can conclude that the equation
Q(S − 1) = −(1 − Q)(T − 1) (9)
determines the position of the phase boundary separating the
sublattice ordered phase from the homogeneous cooperation in
the T − S plane. This mathematical expression reflects clearly
that the straight line phase boundary rotates anti-clockwise
around the point (T = S = 1) from the vertical direction to
the horizontal one when increasing the value of Q from 0 to 1.
The above described analysis can be repeated to study the sta-
bility of the sublattice ordered structure against a single strategy
change from C to D as plotted on the right-hand side of Fig. 6.
It is found that the sublattice ordered structure evolves into the
homogeneous D phase if (1 − Q)S < −QT and the resulting
equation
(1 − Q)S = −QT (10)
gives a boundary line separating the sublattice ordered phase
from the homogeneous defection state in the payoff plane. This
phase boundary is also a straight line rotating clockwise around
the point T = S = 0 from the horizontal (Q = 0) to the vertical
(Q = 1) direction.
The phase boundaries (9) and (10) divide the T − S plane
into four segments excepting the case Q = 1/2 when the given
straight lines are parallel. For Q = 0 these segments are equiv-
alent to those types of games indicated in Figs. 1. The above
stability analysis allows the existence of both the homogeneous
C and D phases within the region of SH game. The simulations
indicate the presence of both phases in a poly-domain structure
during a transient period. The final result of the competition be-
tween these two ordered structure can be deduced by determin-
ing the average velocity of the boundary separating the regions
of homogeneous cooperation and defection. For the present
dynamical rule the most frequent elementary changes are the
shifts of a step-like interface as illustrated in Fig. 7. Evidently
other elementary processes are also observable with a vanishing
probability when K → 0. The latter elementary processes (e.g.
the creation of a new step) can affect only the average velocity
of the interface. Using the above observation as a working hy-
potheses we can derive a condition for the direction of invasion
that is justified by the MC simulations.
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Figure 7: Elementary processes along the interface separating the cooperative
(white) and defective (gray) domains of players.
Namely, along the horizontal interface the step moves right
in the zero noise limit if U(sx = D) > U(sy = C). This yields D
invasion if
2[(1 − Q)T + QS ] > 2[1 + (1 − Q)S + QT ] . (11)
In the opposite case C invasion is preferred and the system
evolves into the state where all the players cooperate. Thus, the
position of the phase boundary separating the homogeneous C
and D phases can be given by a straight line
S = T − 1
1 − 2Q (12)
in the T − S plane.
Here it is worth mentioning that the phase boundary deter-
mined by (12) coincides with those suggestion derived from the
criterion of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) favor-
ing the selection of those strategy that provides higher utility if
the co-player chooses her strategy at random. In other words,
the present myopic strategy update (on the square lattice) can
be considered as a realization of the criterion of risk dominance
in the crucial local constellations because the players x and y
are surrounded by two cooperators and two defectors.
The results of the above stability analysis are summarized in
Figs. 8. It is emphasized that the three phase boundaries [given
by eqs. (9), (10), and (12)] meet at a so-called tricritical point
(if Q , 1/2) and divide the T − S plane into three parts in
agreement with the expectations deduced from the MC results
in the low noise limit. Fig. 8 illustrates graphically what hap-
pens if the value of Q is increased gradually. The territory of the
homogeneous cooperation and the sublattice ordered structures
expand in the T − S plane at the expense of the homogeneous
defection if Q → 1/2. Evidently this process is accompanied
with a relevant increase in the total payoff for the payoff param-
eters involved. This process is saturated for Q = 1/2 when the
system achieves the optimum total payoff for any payoff ma-
trix. For further increase of Q the process is reversed within
some territory of H and SH games where the system can evolve
into the ”tragedy of the commons” as demonstrated in Fig. 8 for
Q = 1 when the system (effective payoff) can be mapped to the
case of selfish player by exchanging the payoffs S ↔ T . Con-
sequently, the overstatement of the other regarding preference
may also results in a social dilemma.
5. Summary
We have introduced a spatial evolutionary game with a my-
opic strategy update rule to study what happens if the play-
ers’ characters, regarding the target utility, are tuned continu-
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Figure 8: (Color online) T − S phase diagram in the zero noise limit for four
different values of Q. The ordered phases are denoted by the same colors as in
Fig. 1d.
ously. The two extreme characters are the egoist players (maxi-
mizing their own income irrespective of others) and the com-
pletely altruistic players or lovers who try to maximize the
others’ income irrespective of their own payoff. This feature
is quantified by introducing a utility function composed from
the player’s and the co-player’s incomes with suitable weight
factors. It turned out that all the relevant results can be ex-
plained by considering an effective payoff matrix in agreement
with previous investigations (Grafen, 1979; Maynard Smith,
1982; Taylor and Nowak, 2007). Despite its simplicity this
model indicated clearly the importance of the fraternal behav-
ior. Namely, the highest total income is achieved by the society
whose members share their income fraternally. Any deviation
from the fraternal behavior can result in the emergence of the
”tragedy of the commons” within a suitable region of payoff pa-
rameters even for altruistic players characterized by the other-
regarding preference.
Finally, to exemplify the lover’s dilemma we end this work
by citing the opening sentences of the paper by Frohlich (1974):
”There is a famous story written by O’Henry about a poor
young couple in love at Christmas time (”The Gift of the
Magi”). Neither has any money with which to buy the other
a present, although each knows what the other wants. Each has
only one prized possession: he, his father’s gold pocket watch;
she, her beautiful long hair. He has long been coveting a gold
watch fob, while she has long admired a pair of tortoise shell
hair combs in a nearby shop. The conclusion of the story is the
exchange of gifts, along with a description of their means of
getting the money for their purchases. He gives her the combs
(having pawned his watch to raise the money). She gives him
the watch fob (having cut and sold her hair).” The mentioned
6
example is discussed exhaustively in the text book by Barash
(2003).
This work was supported by the Hungarian National Re-
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